Inside the Navy's New Rapid Capabilities Office Kickoff: What DIB Leaders Need to Know

By Andrew Park | 2025-12-09

I attended the Department of the Navy Rapid Capabilities Office (DON RCO) kickoff today at the Capital Factory building in Washington, DC. It was standing room only. The office is so new their website went live today. For those who couldn't make it, here's what the Navy communicated about their new approach to rapid capabilities acquisition.

Executive Summary

The Navy launched a new Rapid Capabilities Office designed to deliver technology to warfighters at commercial speed, not traditional acquisition timelines. Key takeaways:

• Structure: 30 person core team embedding "Rapid Capability Cells" (small fast moving teams) across the Navy's Program Executive Offices (the groups that manage weapons and equipment programs) rather than building a new bureaucracy

• Approach: Monthly "Bets Boards" (review meetings to approve or reject projects) at the Vice Admiral level with direct visibility to the Navy's top leadership. Focus on outcomes over compliance.

• Timeline: Contract awards in weeks, prototyping in months, deployment to military units in quarters

• Technology Priorities: Expendable unmanned systems, low detectability technologies, naval combat capabilities, hard to jam communications, affordable weapons at scale, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) that works without constant connectivity

• Industry Access: Open submission portal (Vulcan) with broad calls for technology. Industry engagement events in New York (January), California (February), and Austin (March)

• Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Robotics and Autonomous Systems (PAE RAS): New senior executive position consolidating 200+ separate robotic and autonomous system programs (previously scattered across multiple offices) into single organization for faster decision making

• Philosophy: Secretary Hegseth's push for wartime urgency. Secretary Phelan's message: operate like businesses that adapt or die (Kodak example). Success means capabilities delivered, not process followed.

Context: Acquisition Reform Meets Wartime Urgency

The DON RCO launch comes amid Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth's push for wartime urgency across the Department and defense industrial base (the network of companies that design, produce, and maintain military equipment) regarding modernization. The Navy speakers repeatedly emphasized the need to operate at the pace of commercial industry, not traditional acquisition timelines.

Secretary Phelan framed the challenge bluntly: "The question has never been whether we have the capital. The question now is whether we have the institutional architecture that can absorb risk, take risk, accelerate winners and retire dead ends."

What DON RCO Actually Is

Led by Jim Juster, the DON RCO is structured as a 30 person core team that operates through a partner network across multiple Program Executive Offices (PEOs, the organizations that manage major weapon systems and equipment programs) and the newly stood up Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Robotics and Autonomous Systems (PAE RAS).

According to the briefings, the mission is to identify operational problems, match them with mature technology (proven technology that's ready to deploy, not early stage research), prototype solutions, and deliver to warfighters, meaning sailors and Marines in operational units, at commercial speed.

Four key organizational principles they outlined:

1. User Centered From Day One: Juster explained that every project starts with fleet operators defining the problem and stays with operators throughout development. No thousand page requirements documents. Clear problem statements with measurable outcomes. In my experience, access to warfighters for requirements discovery has been one of the most challenging aspects of developing solutions. They've historically been largely inaccessible and didn't prioritize spending time with vendors for requirements discovery. If the RCO can actually solve this structural problem and make operators integral to the process from day one, that alone would be transformative.

2. Betting, Not Planning: Juster framed everything as a bet: resources against expected outcomes. As he put it, not every bet pays off, but the surest way not to win is not to bet. The RCO has created a monthly Bets Board at the three star level (Vice Admiral and equivalent) with direct CNO (Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy's top uniformed officer) and Commandant (Marine Corps top officer) visibility.

3. Rapid Capability Cells: Rather than building a massive bureaucracy, Juster explained, the RCO embeds small Rapid Capability Cells within existing PEOs. The goal is making rapid prototyping (quickly building and testing working versions of technology) a normal, organic function across Navy acquisition, not a boutique capability.

4. Outcomes Over Compliance: This is the cultural shift Juster emphasized. The Navy is moving from a compliance based mindset (following process and checking boxes) to an outcomes based one (did it work and did we deliver capability?). As Vice Admiral (VADM) Okano put it, "We've been trained for the last 30 to 40 years in compliance. This is rewiring our brains to say outcomes matter more than compliance." This shift requires more than good intentions. It requires product management talent that can ruthlessly prioritize outcomes, make trade offs, and kill programs that aren't delivering. I've written before about the critical gap in product management talent in the Department and the defense industrial base. Without that talent in place, "outcomes over compliance" risks becoming another talking point rather than an operational reality.

The Technology Focus Areas

Jim Juster, Director of the DON RCO, outlined six priority technology domains where the RCO is seeking solutions:

1. Attritable Unmanned Systems (UxVs): Attritable means expendable or acceptable to lose in combat, unlike expensive ships or aircraft. These are unmanned systems (air, surface, and undersea vehicles) with flexible payloads (the mission equipment or weapons they carry) and swappable capabilities that the Navy is genuinely willing to lose without hesitation.

2. Signature Reduction and Mitigation: Signature refers to the detectability of a platform through radar, infrared heat, acoustic sound, or electromagnetic emissions. Not just stealth, but innovative approaches to reducing or mitigating these signatures while maintaining operational capability. This includes clever RF (radio frequency) engineering, alternative electromagnetic modalities, and resilient communications in contested environments (operational areas where adversaries are actively interfering with or threatening our forces, such as jamming signals or attempting intercepts).

3. Asymmetric Offensive and Defensive Systems: Finding and defeating enemy platforms and weapons. The goal is asymmetric advantage through rapid technology integration. Asymmetric advantage means using cheaper, faster solutions to impose disproportionately high costs on adversaries. Think small drones costing thousands forcing adversaries to use million dollar interceptors, or forcing expensive capital ships (major vessels like aircraft carriers, destroyers, and cruisers costing billions) to alter operations. This has become critical as conflicts in Ukraine and the Red Sea demonstrate how low cost systems can effectively threaten or tie down high value assets.

4. Low Probability Communications and Sensing: LPI (Low Probability of Intercept), LPD (Low Probability of Detection), and LPE (Low Probability of Exploitation) across the electromagnetic spectrum. In plain terms: communications and sensors that are hard to detect, hard to jam, and hard to exploit if intercepted (meaning adversaries can't extract useful intelligence, mimic the signals, or reverse engineer the technology). The recognition that any game changing solution will require continuous adaptation as adversaries catch up.

5. Affordable Mass Precision Fires: Good enough weapons at scale. Not exquisite systems (high end, highly capable but expensive platforms) for every mission, but narrowly defined solutions for specific use cases that are effective, affordable, and deliverable with mature technology. Think cost effective missiles and munitions that can be produced in quantity.

6. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Decision Superiority: Making operational planning (how missions are designed and executed) easier, pairing sensors and weapons dynamically, and ensuring AI tools work in contested environments where networks may be degraded or compromised. The focus is on AI that can operate when connectivity is limited or unreliable.

Industry Engagement Approach

The RCO outlined their approach for industry engagement. They're using Vulcan (a technology submission platform used by over 950 defense organizations including US Special Operations Command, Defense Cyber Operations, and other Department program offices) as their enterprise data system for technology submissions, with both broad calls for submissions and targeted calls for specific needs.

Points emphasized for industry:

• Be Detailed: When submitting technology, provide comprehensive information. The RCO needs to filter thousands of proposals down to the best ten for detailed evaluation. The more detail you provide, the better your chances. This guidance differs from past calls for brevity, likely because they intend to use AI to process proposals at scale. Detailed submissions will help them quickly discern what differentiates your solution from multiple similar proposals.

• Expect Speed: They're messaging contract awards in weeks, not years. Prototyping in months. Deployment to military units in quarters. They emphasized this isn't aspirational but the operational model they intend to use. Given traditional acquisition timelines, this represents a significant departure from the norm.

• Prepare for Transparency: Clear feedback on what works and what doesn't. If technology doesn't scale or an approach doesn't deliver, you'll hear about it quickly. Fast failure beats slow mediocrity. This is a departure from traditional acquisition where companies can stay in programs for years despite underperformance because no one wants to admit the program isn't working. This is a departure from traditional acquisition where companies can stay in programs for years despite underperformance because no one wants to admit the program isn't working.

• Think About Scale From Day One: Even for prototypes, the RCO wants to understand your path to scale (ability to ramp up to full production volumes). If a solution succeeds, the first question will be "How fast can you deliver these?" This addresses a chronic problem where prototype successes couldn't transition to programs of record because no one thought about manufacturing, supply chain, or production costs until after the technology was proven.

The RCO will be taking the show on the road. New York in January, California in February, Austin in March. They said these won't be just briefings but working sessions to align industry capabilities with operational problems.

The PAE RAS Component

Vice Admiral (VADM) Okano provided a preview of the Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Robotics and Autonomous Systems (PAE RAS), which will be the Department's very first PAE and begins operations this Friday. It consolidates over 200 separate programs across six PEOs and twenty program offices into a single organization. This addresses a critical fragmentation problem (too many offices managing similar programs) and creates one entry point for autonomy and robotic systems.

The organizing principle is speed. Close the distance between operator, industry, and acquisition. The mission managers will focus on combined missions across all domains (air, land, sea, undersea), not platform specific programs.

The Secretary's Message

Secretary of the Navy John Phelan used a Kodak analogy to illustrate the risk of institutional complacency: having talent and resources means nothing if decision cycles are optimized for the world you once lived in rather than the one you're entering. Kodak invented the digital camera but failed to capitalize on it because it threatened their film business. They filed for bankruptcy in 2012.

His comparison to the Liberty ships of World War II (WWII) wasn't nostalgia. It was a challenge. Those ships were built in 42 days because the nation demanded it and industry delivered. That spirit of industrial velocity as strategic advantage is what he's calling for today.

"This is dual use technology development at scale," Phelan emphasized. "When the Navy validates that an autonomous system performs in contested maritime environments (areas where adversaries are actively trying to disrupt operations), that technology has potential to expand for commercial maritime applications. The government becomes the first customer that proves the technology works at scale." Dual use means technology with both military and commercial applications. The Department hopes to leverage commercial investment rather than bearing full development costs alone, though this strategy can have unintended side effects worth considering.

What Success Looks Like

By 2028, the Navy outlined what success means:

• Sailors and Marines have the most lethal and reliable systems in the world in their hands, not in development or testing

• Technology that actually works reliably, allowing operators to focus on fighting and winning rather than troubleshooting equipment

• The Navy becomes known for innovation, not just talks about it in speeches

• The cultural changes survive beyond the current administration and become how the Navy operates permanently

As Secretary Phelan put it in the fireside chat: "Zero caskets with an American flag on it. What that ultimately means is you don't get in a fight and deter people from that fight because they know it's not going to be a good outcome for them."

What This Might Mean for Different Audiences

These are my interpretations from being in the room, not official guidance.

The DON RCO represents a significant shift in how the Navy approaches acquisition. I've written before about the changing acquisition landscape and its implications for the defense industrial base. This initiative exemplifies many of those trends in practice. Here's what I think it means for different players:

For Defense Tech Startups

This looks like a genuine opening. You can submit directly through Vulcan without needing a Prime partner, and the monthly Bets Boards mean faster decisions than traditional acquisition timelines. The emphasis on attritable systems and affordable mass plays to your cost structure, and the detailed submission guidance levels the playing field by letting you showcase technical differentiation without needing an established brand name.

The catch? You need to demonstrate you can scale if you win. After a successful prototype, the first question will be "How fast can you deliver at full production volume?" If you can't answer that credibly, the opportunity stops at the prototype phase.

For Primes

This is pressure to prove you can move differently. The RCO is working with PEOs from day one, so you're not cut out. But the speed expectations (contract awards in weeks, prototyping in months) and the emphasis on affordable mass versus exquisite systems challenges traditional approaches.

The new landscape rewards companies that help the Department move faster. Moving early puts you in position to preserve share in a market that's becoming far more competitive. You'll need stronger product management capability to compete in this outcome based environment. The RCO expects you to use independent R&D, uncover real user needs, and produce prototypes before requirements fully mature. This is user centered development, not the thousand page requirements document approach. And you'll need to address technical debt. Hidden technical debt has been bleeding into Department programs for years. Programs no longer have the patience or budget for it. Raising code quality, improving source code maintainability, and tightening development practices will help you meet the performance and sustainment expectations that are now central to what the RCO is looking for.

You'll also need to level up your software development talent. You're about to encounter competition from many Silicon Valley based tech startups with strong software development capabilities. My recommendation is to grow your software talent deliberately before that competition shows up.

The opportunity? You have the infrastructure to scale that startups don't. If you can match their speed in the prototype phase, you have advantages in the production phase. The question is whether your organization can actually operate on these timelines or if the rapid work stays siloed in your "innovation cell" while the rest of the company moves at traditional pace.

My take: Startups have a real shot at prototype awards. Primes that adapt have the edge on scaling to production. Primes that don't adapt risk losing prime contractor positions and becoming subcontractors to the startups that moved faster. I've written about the new acquisition landscape and its implications for the defense industrial base in more depth elsewhere.

For Acquisition Leaders

For PEOs and O-6 program managers, I'm reading this as both an opportunity and a significant challenge. The RCO is embedding Rapid Capability Cells in your organizations. They're not bypassing you, but they are adding speed focused teams with direct lines to three star leadership. You're being asked to partner with them while still delivering on your existing programs.

A few things I'm watching for that might affect how this plays out. Secretary Phelan's Ford carrier example stood out: 8 admirals touched that program, it was 3 years late and substantially over budget, and apparently no one raised their hand early when problems emerged. The emphasis seemed clear: early visibility on problems helps everyone. The RCO wants to know about issues early so they can adapt, not to assign blame.

The shift to outcomes over compliance is challenging when you're the one signing. You're being asked to rewire how you've been trained to think about risk for 30 to 40 years. The calculus is changing where moving slowly but staying compliant might actually be riskier than moving fast and accepting some failures. The difficulty is that your legal, contracting, and oversight systems may not have fully adjusted to this new model yet. You're navigating that tension.

Each PEO will have Rapid Capability Cells that need dedicated personnel making rapid prototyping a normal function. That's a real challenge when you're still accountable for 100% of your traditional programs. And those Rapid Capability Cells will have monthly visibility at the Bets Board, which means there's natural comparison between rapid efforts and traditional programs. Managing both rhythms simultaneously is the test.

My sense is that the PEOs and O-6s who figure out how to integrate this into their existing structures, rather than treating it as separate "innovation theater," will be positioned for success. You've got the institutional knowledge and relationships that matter. The question is whether the system gives you the space to operate differently.

Summary

The DON RCO briefings outlined an organizational structure and acquisition approach designed around speed. The Rapid Capability Cells, monthly Bets Boards at the three star level, and consolidated PAE RAS structure represent the mechanisms they've put in place.

The speakers emphasized repeatedly that they're seeking industry partners who can operate at commercial timelines: prototyping in months, deploying to military units in quarters, with contract awards in weeks rather than years.

As Director Juster put it: "We need you to be successful. This is a partnership. If the system were solving this already, we wouldn't all be here today."

Whether this approach proves successful remains to be seen. But the stated commitment is clear, the organizational mechanisms are established, and the front door for industry engagement is open.

A Note of Caution and Support

In conversations with a couple of senior civilian defense leaders after the event, people with decades long careers in defense, I heard caution about rapid capability efforts. Both pointed to past initiatives that made similar promises but didn't pan out. One described how the valley of death for defense innovation is littered with well intentioned programs that couldn't sustain momentum or overcome institutional resistance.

That said, I believe we need to keep trying until we figure this out. The threat environment isn't waiting for us to get our acquisition process right. I've been wanting to see change that results in better outcomes and far less waste since my college intern days in the defense sector. The necessity is real, and the current approach is unacceptable from both a national security perspective and from a taxpayer perspective. What gives me more optimism about this iteration is that the philosophy they're pushing actually aligns with what's needed: outcomes over compliance, fast failure over slow mediocrity, and accountability at every level.

The question isn't whether rapid capability acquisition is hard. We know it is. The question is whether this particular combination of leadership commitment, organizational structure, and cultural pressure will be the one that finally sticks.